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ABSTRACT
This article provides a quantitative analysis of privacy com-
promising mechanisms on one million popular websites. Find-
ings indicate that nearly nine in ten websites leak user data
to parties of which the user is likely unaware of; over six
in ten websites spawn third-party cookies; and over eight
in ten websites load Javascript code from external parties
onto users’ computers. Sites which leak user data contact
an average of nine external domains, indicating users may
be tracked by multiple entities in tandem. By tracing the
unintended disclosure of personal browsing histories on the
web, it is revealed that a handful of American companies re-
ceive the vast bulk of user data. Finally, roughly one in five
websites are potentially vulnerable to known NSA spying
techniques at the time of analysis.
General Terms
Behavioral Tracking, Hidden Web, Privacy, Advertising, In-
ternet Policy, Do Not Track
1. INTRODUCTION
If, as it seemed, the new technology was on a collision course
with the values of personal privacy and human dignity, could
the collision be averted? Could a system be devised to iden-
tify and permit beneficial uses of the new technology and yet,
at the same time, preclude those uses that most men would
deem intolerable?
- Alan Westin, 1967
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As the past several decades have shown, the beneficial as-
pects of information technologies have proven truly remark-
able and fundamentally transformative, yet they have also
ushered in an age of nearly limitless surveillance. It is this
use of information technology for surveillance purposes which
Alan Westin described as potentially “intolerable” nearly 50
years ago [28]. Indeed, every new device, app, and social
network is now assumed to come with hidden privacy risks.
Where the economy of the past century relied on cash for
most transactions; personal behavioral data has become a
currency of its own in the current century. Learning what
an individual does with her or his time, be it browse spe-
cific websites or purchase particular products, has become
a means to more efficiently target products and services to
those who fit certain behavioral profiles.
Efforts to collect personal behavioral data has extended to
governments as well. News reports based on internal docu-
ments of the United States National Security Agency (NSA)
leaked by former contractor Edward Snowden have revealed
that the U.S. government has constructed a surveillance sys-
tem of such complexity and scope that it fulfills the dire
warnings made by Senator Frank Church, who suggested in
1975 that the NSA’s technological capabilities carried with
them “the capacity...to make tyranny total in America”, and
that a fully realized technological surveillance state consti-
tuted “abyss from which there is no return” [4]. Thus, look-
ing back on the worries of both Westin and Church within
the context of the present day, we may see that their warn-
ings, however extreme, had significant merit. It is now clear
that information technologies carry with them externalities
which are socially intolerable, and that the realities of state
surveillance often exceed the worst predictions of yesteryear.
However, despite the warnings of Westin and Church proving
prescient, there are many opportunities to shift the balance
of power in favor of privacy and user choice.
While Westin and Church both dealt with many hypotheti-
cal scenarios and little knowledge of future technologies, to-
day the general principals of computing, data storage, and
networking are well known. Those with technical knowledge
of computing systems may use that knowledge to analyze
the surveillance systems which affect the lives of billions
of Internet users. As with discussions of other social ills
such as poverty and preventable disease, debates on issues
of surveillance are served when backed by sound quantita-
tive measures. Thus, in order to escape Church’s “abyss”,
public policy advocates must identify and enumerate specific
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forms of surveillance, the scope of this surveillance, and the
commercial and government practitioners of it.
The purpose of this article is to provide a quantitative anal-
ysis of privacy compromising mechanisms on the top one
million websites as determined by the Alexa company. It
shall be demonstrated that nearly nine in ten websites leak
user data to parties of which the user is likely unaware of;
over six in ten websites spawn third-party cookies; and over
eight in ten websites load Javascript code. Sites which leak
user data contact an average of nine external domains. Most
importantly, by tracing the flows of personal browsing his-
tories on the web, it is possible to discover the corporations
which profit from tracking user. While there are a number
of companies tracking users online, the overall landscape
is highly consolidated, with the top corporation, Google,
tracking users on nearly eight of ten sites in the Alexa top
one million. Finally, by consulting internal NSA documents
leaked by Edward Snowden, it has been determined that
roughly one in five websites are potentially vulnerable to
known NSA spying techniques at the time of analysis.
It should be noted that this is not the first quantitative study
of privacy online. However, the vast majority of quantita-
tive research in the area of web tracking has appeared in the
computer science literature with scholars such as Krishna-
murty and Wills conducting foundational studies as far back
as 2006. These studies provide essential insights into the na-
ture and scope of online tracking, but require a high level of
technical expertise to understand. This has had the unfor-
tunate side-effect of re-enforcing barriers between disciplines
and reducing the potential for cross-disciplinary work. This
is despite the fact the Communication discipline has tradi-
tionally played a strong role in areas of telecommunications
and media policy. For these reasons, this article aims to
bridge a disciplinary gap.
This article begins with a technical primer on how web track-
ing works, explores previous research in the area, and then
explicates several research questions. This is followed by a
methodology section which details a new open-source soft-
ware platform, named webXray, which has been developed
to conduct this research. Finally, findings are presented
along with suggestions for how policy makers may shift the
balance away from unchecked surveillance towards respect
for user preferences.
2. BACKGROUND: THIRD-PARTYHTTPRE-
QUESTS AND USER TRACKING
In order to fully appreciate how companies track users on the
web, a technical aside is in order. When a user’s web browser
makes a request to load a web page it receives an HTML file
from the server associated with a given domain (such as
“http://example.com” where “example.com” is the domain).
Any request to download content, such as a web page, uses
the hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) in order to connect
the user to the server hosting the content they desire [7].
There are only two parties involved in the transaction: the
user and the company who owns server. Due to the fact
that only one server is being connected to, and the address
of that server is visible in the browser address bar, these are
often called “first-party” requests.
The beauty of HTML, and the web itself, is that HTML
pages can include additional pieces of content, called “ele-
ments”, from a limitless array of additional parties. Such
elements may include pictures, videos, and Javascript code.
However, when new content is included from outside do-
mains, the number of parties involved goes from two to three:
the user, the site she or he is visiting, and the entity pro-
viding the additional content. For this reason, an image or
other piece of content from an external server may be called
a “third-party element” (sometimes abbreviated to “3PE”),
and the process of downloading such an element is the result
of a “third-party request”.
Every time an HTTP request is made, information about
the user is transmitted to the server hosting the content.
This data includes the IP address of the computer making
the request, the date and time the request was made, as well
as the type of computer and web browser employed by the
user, which is known as the “user-agent” field. In addition,
the address of the page which initiated the request, known
as the “referer” [sic], is included. This information is found
in the raw data of the HTTP request itself, an example of
which is shown below:
IP: 8.67.53.09
DATE: [10/May/2014:19:54:25 +0000]
REQUEST: "GET /tracking_pixel.png HTTP/1.1"
REFERER: "http://example.com/private_matters.html"
USER-AGENT: "Mac OS X 10_8_5...AppleWebKit/537.71"
From the above information, the server receiving the request
for the file “tracking pixel.png” can determine that it was
made from a user with the IP address 8.67.53.09, using the
Safari browser on a Macintosh computer, who is currently
viewing a webpage with the address “http://example.com/
private matters.html”. If the server has many such records,
patterns of behavior may be attributed to the same combi-
nation of IP and user-agent information. This is the most
basic form of tracking and is common to all HTTP requests
made on the web.
Before companies engaged in web tracking may harvest HTTP
request data they must first get their elements included in
the source code of a page. In some cases advertisers pay
to have their elements on a page, and this is the dominant
business model for online publishers [24]. However, the ma-
jority of third-party HTTP requests are made to corpora-
tions such as Google, Facebook, and Twitter which provide
free services such as traffic analytics and social media tools.
While web masters do not pay for such tools, the hidden
cost of privacy loss is incurred by unwitting users.
Despite the fact that this situation is already rather murky
from the user’s perspective, it actually gets worse. Some
third-party elements are also able to store information on a
user’s computer using small files called cookies [14]. Cook-
ies may be used as a unique identifier which is affixed to
the browser of a given user. This is analogous to the track-
ing bracelets ornithologists place on migratory birds, even
if users visit unrelated sites, tracking cookies have rendered
them tagged and traceable. A user may delete or block
cookies, potentially restoring some privacy. However, other
third-party requests may download sophisticated Javascript
code which can execute commands on users’ computers, fa-
cilitating advanced forms of tracking known as “browser
fingerprinting” (see Eckersley, 2010 for an early study on
the topic). By detecting the unique characteristics of a
given computer, browser fingerprinting is analogous its of-
fline form; the specific list of fonts installed on a computer
may function like a loop or a whorl on a finger - given com-
binations are often unique to an individual. Also like real
fingerprints, it is often difficult to hide or change a browser’s
fingerprint. The attention of corporations is rapidly turning
to fingerprinting techniques for this reason and cookies are
quickly falling out of favor.
3. PREVIOUS RESEARCH
Previous research in web privacy has generally focused on
three main areas: attitudes of users towards the idea of be-
ing tracked, the mechanisms which facilitate tracking, and
measurement of how much tracking is happening. The ma-
jority of research regarding attitudes has taken place within
the fields of communication and law, whereas mechanisms
and measurement research has primarily been the domain
of computer science.
3.1 Attitudes
Opinion research regarding online privacy has been ongo-
ing since the 1990s. Yet, as much as the web has changed
since that decade, attitudes towards privacy have remained
fairly constant. In 1999 “respondents registered a high level
of concern about privacy in general and on the Internet”
[2]. Likewise, a 2003 study found that “a clear majority of
Americans express worry about their personal information
on the web” [25]. A 2009 survey found that “69% of Amer-
ican adults fe[lt] there should be a law that gives people
the right to know everything that a website knows about
them” [27]. Similar work in 2012 showed that 60% of re-
spondents would like the proposed “Do Not Track” (DNT)
standard to prevent websites from collecting personal infor-
mation (DNT is further explained in the discussion section)
[9]. In a 2014 study, “Public Perceptions of Privacy and
Security in the Post-Snowden Era”, the Pew Research Cen-
ter discovered that 70% of respondents felt records of the
websites they had visited constituted “very” or “somewhat”
sensitive information [16]. One reason marketers may argue
that online data collection is acceptable is that consumers
are making a tradeoff between privacy and discounts; yet a
2015 study found that 91% of respondents disagreed with
the statement “If companies give me a discount, it is a fair
exchange for them to collect information about me without
my knowing it” [26]. The general trend established by these
surveys is not just that most users value privacy, but that
the current state of privacy online represents an area of sig-
nificant anxiety. Indeed, research into the mechanisms of
tracking highlight that there is serious cause for concern.
3.2 Mechanisms
Computer security research has explored many novel meth-
ods of compromising user privacy. This has included detect-
ing the if a user had visited a page based on the color of
a given hyperlink [10], analyzing Flash “cookies” which sur-
vive user deletion [3], the increasingly popular fingerprint-
ing techniques discussed above [6, 20, 1], as well as other
uses of Javascript [11]. The common thread among such re-
search is to focus on ways in which a browser may be used
to extract more information about the user than is typically
provided by HTTP request headers. This focus on what is
called the “client-side” (i.e. the user’s computer rather than
the server) is born of the fact that researchers have long as-
sumed “that sites are not able to reliably track users using
just their IP address and user-agent string” [10]. In other
words, this means that the basic information detailed above
from an HTTP request is insufficient to track users with the
same level of accuracy as other methods such as cookies or
fingerprinting. However, this assumption has been proven
wrong.
Even without direct browser manipulation, Yen et al. have
demonstrated that solely by analyzing HTTP headers on a
multi-million point dataset they were able to reach a user
identification rate of 80%, which is “similar to that obtained
with cookies” [29]. This finding is significant because it
demonstrates that third-party HTTP requests by themselves
hold similar potential for compromising user privacy as the
more commonly studied client-side techniques. A single
HTTP request is unlikely to result in user identification,
but thousands of such requests may be correlated to a given
user. Such techniques happen on the servers of corporations,
and are largely hidden from analysts of client-side code.
3.3 Measurement
The third general area of research focus has been in mea-
surement. In this case, the interest of the researcher is in
selecting a population of websites and essentially conduct-
ing a census of tracking mechanisms, third-party requests,
and data flows. Much of the pioneering work in this area
has been conducted by Krishnamurthy and Wills. In 2006
they advanced the concept of the “privacy footprint” which
they describe as a means to analyze the “diffusion of infor-
mation about a user’s actions by measuring the number of
associations between visible nodes via one or more common
hidden nodes”[13]. What Krishnamurthy and Wills describe
as “hidden nodes”, may be more widely included under the
umbrella of third-party requests. This work was followed
up several years later with a longitudinal study [12]. The
data presented in this article updates and advances Krish-
namurthy and Wills findings with a larger sample.
While Krishnamurthy and Wills have done an excellent job
in the area of measurement, they are far from the only re-
searchers exploring the topic. Castelluccia and colleagues
have recently analyzed“the flows of personal data at a global
level” [5], and found intriguing differences in the nature,
scope, and ownership of tracking mechanisms around the
world. Other researchers have developed desktop browser
add-ons [21, 17] which they have used to detect the presence
of a variety of tracking mechanisms. Some of the most re-
cent measurement literature focuses on fingerprinting specif-
ically [1]. Additional research has revealed extensive track-
ing on websites containing health information [15]. A com-
mon theme among all measurement research is that the
amount of tracking on the web is increasing, and shows no
signs of abating.
4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This article seeks to update and advance knowledge in three
main areas: the general size and nature of the hidden web,
the corporate ownership patterns which affect user privacy,
and the degree to which state surveillance is facilitated by
commercial tracking mechanisms. In regards to general ques-
tions on the size and scope of the web tracking ecosystem,
several issue are explored in depth, among them are the
number of pages which leak user data, how many entities
users are exposed to in tandem, and how this varies among
different countries. Furthermore, third-party elements are
investigated in order to determine if they are visible to the
user, or represent potential attempts at covert tracking. Sec-
ond, and of central interest to this study, the corporations
who are responsible for tracking users online are discovered.
This focus sheds light on the larger social and political-
economic considerations involved in web tracking. Finally,
internal documents released by former U.S. National Secu-
rity Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden, have re-
vealed that the spy agency has leveraged commercial track-
ing tools in order to monitor users. Thus, this research
project also seeks to detect commercial tracking mechanisms
known to be co-opted by the NSA.
5. METHODOLOGY
Following the findings of Yen et al. described above, it is
clear that third-party HTTP requests provide an excellent
unit of analysis for examining the extent of tracking on the
web. Such requests are potentially as revealing and invasive
as cookies, and are a basic prerequisite of every single family
of tracking techniques. Regardless of what cookies are set,
or what “fingerprints” are taken from a browser, a connec-
tion between the user and the server of the tracker needs
to be established via HTTP. By examining HTTP requests
in bulk, a picture of data flows emerges. On a sufficiently
large data set those requests which have a benign function
fade into the long tail of data, and those which happen with
great regularity are easily spotted. Therefore, this research
faces two basic problems: what sites form a sufficiently large
population, and how to analyze third-party HTTP requests
on each site.
The best population of sites was determined to be the top
one million sites list published by Alexa12. Alexa is a sub-
sidiary of Amazon who provides website traffic metrics and
rankings derived from a “panel of toolbar users which is a
sample of all [I]nternet users”3. The degree to which Alexa’s
data accurately represents popularity on the web is debat-
able as Alexa Toolbar users are by no means a random sam-
ple of all Internet users. However, it has become common
practice for researchers to use the Alexa list in the absence
of other, better lists [13, 12, 11, 17, 21, 5, 20, 1]. For this
study the full Alexa list was downloaded in May of 2014.
In order to detect tracking on the sites selected, the we-
bXray software (version 1.0) was used. webXray is written
primarily in Python and works in several steps. First, a list
of website addresses is given to the program. This list is
1http://s3.amazonaws.com/alexa-static/top-1m.csv.zip
2https://support.alexa.com/hc/en-us/articles/200449834-
Does-Alexa-have-a-list-of-its-top-ranked-websites-
3https://alexa.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/200449744-
How-are-Alexa-s-traffic-rankings-determined-
processed to ensure all of the addresses are properly format-
ted, are not links to common binary files (such .pdf or .xls),
and are not duplicates. Next, each site is relayed via the
Python subprocess module to a command-line instantiation
of the headless web browser PhantomJS. In this context,
“headless” refers to the fact that the browser runs on a com-
mand line and does not require a graphical user interface;
this makes PhantomJS ideal for deployment on a “cloud”-
based virtual machine. PhantomJS takes as arguments a
web address and a Javascript program which is responsible
for loading the website, processing the page title and meta-
data, collecting cookies, and detecting both HTTP requests
and HTTP received events. In order to successfully follow
multiple redirects and allow elements to download, Phan-
tomJS is given 30 seconds to complete loading the page.
The results are passed back to the Python script as JSON
data and processing resumes. Data about the page, such
as title and meta description, are stored in a database, and
then HTTP requests are examined.
webXray utilizes the Mozilla Public Suffix List 4 in order to
determine the domain of each HTTP request (sub-domains
are ignored). Requests which have the same domain as
the page address are ignored (e.g. “http://example.com”
and “http://images.example.com/header.png”), whereas re-
quests with different domains are entered into a database of
third-party elements (e.g. “http://example.com” and “http:
//www. google-analytics.com/ utm.gif”). This process is
repeated for storing third-party cookies. Request strings are
additionally parsed to remove argument data from the do-
main and element. For example, the following string:
\protect\vrule width0pt\protect\href{http://sub.example.com/tracking_pixel.png?id=8675309}{http://sub.example.com/tracking_pixel.png?id=8675309}
is broken up as having the domain “example.com”, the el-
ement “tracking pixel.png”, the arguments “?id=8675309”,
and the file extension “png”. File extensions of elements
(e.g. “png”, “js”, “css”) are used to catalog elements by type
(e.g. “image”, “Javascript”, “Cascading Style Sheet”).
Finally, after a scan is completed the top 100 domains are
identified and ownership information is manually determined.
The process primarily relies on using the whois utility to
look for domain registration records. In cases where whois
records are unhelpful the domain or element is loaded into
a browser in order to follow redirects to a parent site. If
this fails, web searches are used to find ownership. When
smaller companies are found, the website Crunchbase is con-
sulted to determine if they are subsidiaries or acquisitions
of larger companies. Great care in this process is taken
to ensure ownership findings are accurate and the “About”
pages of all companies are consulted as part of the pro-
cess. One additional barrier is the fact that many com-
panies have several domains. For example, Google has by
far the most domains, with several hundred unique entries
listed on Wikipedia5; the names of these domains range from
the transparent (“google.com”, “google.fr”) to the opaque
(“1e100.net”, “ggpht.com”). Adobe was found to be using
many domains as well - again, some obvious (“adobe.com”),
4http://publicsuffix.org/
5https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of Google domains
and some not (“2o7.net”). This pattern of household brand-
names using unfamiliar domains held fast for a number of
companies including Twitter, Facebook, and Amazon. It
should be noted that there is nothing particularly nefarious
about companies using unfamiliar domains to host content,
only that it presents a barrier during the analysis process. In
total, over 500 distinct domains were traced back to 140 dif-
ferent companies. In order to reduce false-positives, domains
which are requested by only a single site are ignored in the
final analysis. For example, if the site “http://example.com”
was the only site to initiate a request to the domain“example-
images.com”, it is ignored. This approach leaves only do-
mains which can conceivably link visitors between two or
more sites in the analysis pool.
6. FINDINGS
6.1 General Trends
The home pages of the most popular 990,022 websites as
measured by Alexa were analyzed in May, 2014. 96% of
sites (950,489) were successfully analyzed and 4% failed to
load. This failure may be attributed to the top sites lists
containing sites which were not available at the time of anal-
ysis (other webXray tests yielded success rates of over 99%,
indicating the software is not at fault). The pages analyzed
yielded a set of 7,564,492 unique cookies, 21,214,652 unique
element requests, and encompassed 1,056,533 distinct do-
mains. The number of pages which initiated requests to
third-parties was 832,349, representing 88% of the total.
Further analysis determined that sites which do make re-
quests to third parties contact 9.47 distinct domains on av-
erage - indicating that not only is user data being frequently
shared, but it is often being shared with many parties simul-
taneously. 62.9% of sites spawn third-party cookies which
may be used to track users using traditional methods, and
82.99% of sites include third-party Javascript which may
represent the increasing trend towards fingerprinting and
other advanced techniques. It should be noted that since
this study used a specified population rather than a statis-
tical sample, the confidence for these numbers is 100%, but
these results only represent the Alexa top one million - not
the entire web.
In addition to the top level trends, sub-analyses were con-
ducted on the 10 most common top-level domains (TLDs) as
well as U.S. educational (edu) and government (gov) sites.
The top TLDs include the well-known com, net, and org
as well as several country-code top-level domains (ccTLDs)
such as Russia (ru), Germany (de), United Kingdom (uk),
Brazil (br), Japan (jp), Poland (pl), and India (in). Sites
ending in a ccTLD have been registered within a given coun-
try - however, popular sites within a given country often in-
clude com and org sites, so this is not a perfect proxy for
what a user from a given country is exposed to (i.e. do not
assume Russians only visit ru sites). When comparing data
among TLDs, there was not much range in the percentage
of sites which had a third-party element: Russian domains
had the most with 94.33%, and Indian domains had the least
with 81.79%. However, in regards to the average number of
domains contacted, there was a large spread with Brazilian
sites contacting 11 on average and U.S. government sites
contacting 3.61. There was also a wide disparity in the per-
centage of sites spawning third-party cookies: Russia was
again in first place with 89.42% of sites spawning cookies,
whereas only half as many U.S. government sites (39.63%)
did so. Finally, there was not much difference in the per-
centage of sites with third-party Javascript: at the high end
were Russian sites with 88.72%, and at the low end were
Indian sites with 77.14%. These findings are presented in
greater detail in Table 1.
6.2 Types of Requested Elements
In order to determine current trends in tracking mechanisms,
the top 100 requested elements were categorized according
to six major types based on file extensions. Javascript is
by far the most prevalent, being requested in 36% of cases.
Javascript is a popular development language, and many
uses of Javascript are wholly benign, yet still generate HTTP
request records and may potentially be used for advanced
fingerprinting techniques. The analysis of Javascript code is
outside the scope of this article, and this prevalence is noted
in order to highlight trends, not to suggest all Javascript
is designed for fingerprinting. Nevertheless, Javascript ele-
ments may pose a greater potential privacy risk than inert
elements such as images. Pages with the ability to serve dy-
namic content, such as PHP and CGI scripts, make up 9%
of the total. Images, such as tracking pixels, have a history
stretching back to the early days of the web and are still
popular, comprising 7% of the total. Fonts and Cascading
Styles Sheets (CSS) together make up 5% of requests. Two
requests for structured data (JSON) were found in the top
100. 38% of requested elements were not categorizable for
they lacked recognizable file name extensions.
6.2.1 Images
Of the seven identified element types above, six are in no way
visible to the user and will not provide any clue that she or
he is being tracked. However, images could presumably offer
a means for a user to determine there are additional parties
present. Yet, as Table 2 details, only four of the top ten im-
ages are visible, and only two of these have any indication
of what company owns them. The lack of visibility or own-
ership attribution highlights that these images are designed
to avoid detection by users, and are likely a tracking tool.
However, it is well worth noting that even if a given image is
invisible, it may be accompanied by text on the screen which
tells the user that tracking is occurring. The most likely case
for this happening is if the page is also setting a cookie and
the user is in an European country covered by the “cookie”
law (which globally, is not he majority of users). Based on
the methodology used in this study it is not possible to ac-
count for such cases should they exist. That said, half of
the top ten images belong to Google, including the most re-
quested image, the Google Analytics tracking pixel. This
image is found on 46.02% of sites, is only 1x1 pixels large,
and is utilized solely for tracking purposes. The second most
requested image is the Facebook “Like Button”. This image
is both visible and clearly indicates the owner (albeit via
iconography rather than text); it’s prevalence, on 21.34%
of sites, demonstrates that the visual language of Facebook
is having a significant influence on the Alexa top sites. It
should be noted that while this is a Facebook image, the
domain hosting it is “akamaihd.net”. This domain belongs
to the Akamai company which provides hosting services for
major brands around the world.
6.3 Corporate Ownership
The major contribution of this article is to reveal the cor-
porate ownership of tracking mechanisms. This focus is vi-
tal as the very reason that most tracking occurs is for eco-
nomic motives. In order to understand the phenomena of
web tracking, and to craft meaningful policies regulating it,
it is necessary to know the actual extent and reach of the
corporations which may be subject to increased regulation.
The most striking finding of this study is that 78.07% of
websites in the Alexa top million initiate third-party HTTP
requests to a Google-owned domain. While the competitive-
ness of Google is well known in search, mobile phones, and
display advertising, its reach in the web tracking arena is un-
paralleled. The next company, Facebook, is found on a still
significant 32.42% of sites, followed by Akamai (which hosts
Facebook and other companies’ content) on 23.31% of sites,
Twitter with 17.89%, comScore with 11.98%, Amazon with
11.72%, and AppNexus with 11.7%. As Figure 1 demon-
strates, these seven companies dwarf the impact of the next
43 companies. The distribution of companies by percentage
of sites tracked has a marked peak, which quickly descends
into a long tail of 33 companies which track between 1-4%
of sites.
6.4 Commercial Tracking and State Surveil-
lance
In December, 2013, The Washington Post reported that
“The National Security Agency is secretly piggybacking on
the tools that enable Internet advertisers to track consumers,
using ‘cookies’ and location data to pinpoint targets for gov-
ernment hacking and to bolster surveillance” [23]. More
specifically, internal NSA documents leaked to the Post by
former NSA contractor Edward Snowden revealed that a
Google cookie named “PREF” was being used to track tar-
gets online. Additional documents provided to The Guardian
by Snowden detailed that another Google cookie (DoubleClick’s
“id”), was also used by the NSA; in this case to attempt to
compromise the privacy of those using anonymity-focused
Tor network [19].
As noted above, in the course of analyzing the Alexa top one
million websites, 7,564,492 unique cookies were collected.
Investigation of this cookie collection revealed 81,699 pages
(8% of the total) spawning cookies with the name “PREF”
set by Google-owned domains, and an additional 180,212
pages (19% of the total) spawning cookies with the name“id”
from the (also Google-owned) DoubleClick domain. Given
the fact that the Snowden disclosures have often raised more
questions than answers, it is unclear if the identified cook-
ies are being used to surveil users today, and companies
like Google are working admirably hard to improve secu-
rity. However, it is clear that the widely deployed tracking
mechanisms identified in this article are of interest to more
than just advertisers. In the absence of meaningful over-
sight, such mechanisms are ripe for abuse - not only by the
United States intelligence agencies, but by numerous states
around the globe.
6.5 Limitations
While the methodology described above performs very well
at a large scale, it is not without its flaws, and the counts
presented in this article may fall short of the actual number
of third-party HTTP requests being made. These findings
therefore represent a lower bound of the amount of third-
party HTTP requests, with the actual amount likely being
slightly higher. However, given the extensive prevalence of
third-party HTTP requests, this constraint only serves to
highlight the magnitude and scope of the findings.
Potential under-counting may be mainly attributed to the
nature of the investigation itself: third-parties have no de-
sire to be detected by users in the vast majority of cases. As
previous research into mechanisms has demonstrated, ad-
vertisers go to extreme lengths to devise exotic techniques
designed to circumvent user preferences in order to track
their activities. For example, Google recently paid out $39.5
million in federal and state settlements over its use of tech-
niques which circumvented cookie preferences on the Safari
web browser [8]. While nobody went to jail, and Google
admitted no fault, it is becoming clear that advertisers reg-
ularly skirt the border between violating user preferences
and outright violating the law. For this reason, any census
of third-party requests on the web is bound to be subject to
an under-count as those profiting from web tracking prefer
to remain in the shadows.
An additional weakness is that PhantomJS does not support
Adobe Flash, Microsoft Silverlight, or other browser-based
plugins. Requests to download such content are not de-
tected, and if such content subsequently initiates additional
requests those are not recorded either. Historically, Flash
has been a popular means of tracking on the web. However,
Flash is not supported by the vast majority of smartphones
and tablets. Given the fact that industry estimates of mo-
bile browser usage now stand at 37.12% globally6, not only
are Flash elements failing to reach over a third of users, it is
apparent that new developments in tracking will likely not
rely on Flash. It may be too early to declare the end of
Flash-based tracking, but the conclusions of this study are
not significantly skewed by this methodological weakness.
A final reason there may be an undercount is the rapid rate
of ingestion. Given that webXray downloads over 10,000
pages per hour, the volume of requests from the IP address
of the server running webXray will stand out as highly irreg-
ular. Many web masters seek to limit automated scanning
behavior by blocking overly-active IP addresses. Therefore,
it is possible that some third-party domains would have au-
tomatically blocked the IP address, yielding an under-count.
This is one of many trade-offs made to achieve high speed
and low cost, and the above limitations are detailed in order
to account for the most obvious weaknesses in the technique.
A final note is that the analysis was conducted in the United
States where there are no laws which dictate websites must
notify users of cookies, as in the European Union. Thus, el-
ements which are wholly invisible in the United States and
elsewhere may come with visual indications for EU users.
No research methodology is perfect, and the enumerated
problems represent the type of relative uncertainty which
is common in all research. None of the problems with we-
bXray serve to significantly undermine the extensive findings
detailed above.
6http://gs.statcounter.com/#all-comparison-ww-monthly-
201407-201507
7. DISCUSSION: DO NOT TRACK
Of the top 100 third-party elements discovered in this study,
only seven were images; of these images, only two provided
any indication of who the images were owned by. This means
that 98% of the identified tracking elements may never alert
users to their presence. Furthermore, the 2% which indi-
cate ownership do not advertise their purpose - only their
presence. Thus, the question we must face is that if atti-
tudes research has proven users do not want to be tracked,
and such tracking in wide-spread and largely undetectable,
how can we bring user expectations and corporate behav-
ior inline? How can we eliminate the socially “intolerable”
from the present ad-supported web? There are three main
solutions which are being pursued at present: industry “opt-
out” mechanisms, browser add-ons, and the “Do Not Track”
(DNT) mechanism. The first two solutions are ineffectual
to varying degrees, and the third will need the power of leg-
islation in order to be respected by corporations.
While it is close to impossible for non-EU users to see they
are being tracked, they have the possibility to infer as much
from the presence of advertisements in their browser. Many
such advertisements come with a very small blue arrow which
when clicked will eventually bring the user to the “online
home of the Digital Advertising Alliance’s (DAA) Self-Regulatory
Program for Online Behavioral Advertising”.7 On this web-
sites a user may opt-out of targeted advertising. However,
while most reasonable users would assume opting-out means
they will not be tracked, the DAA interprets it to mean that
users “opt out from receiving interest-based advertising”.8
This means that users may still be tracked, they just will
not see tailored advertisements. This practice is misleading
at best and deceptive at worst. Furthermore, the opt-out
mechanism requires the user to set a large array of cookies
on her or his browser. Thus, if a user has been protect-
ing their privacy by turning off third-party cookies, she or
he must turn them back on and potentially be exposed to
more tracking as not all trackers are members of the DAA.
The industry solution is insufficient at best and intentionally
misleading at worst.
The next means of protection, the use of browser add-ons,
is vastly more effective at preventing tracking, but comes
with several problems. First, the only means a user has
for knowing that such mechanisms are available is by read-
ing news stories which highlight the add-ons, or by brows-
ing lists of popular add-ons for various browsers (privacy
add-ons routinely make top-ten lists). A user must there-
fore actively seek out this complex remedy and spend a sig-
nificant amount of time learning about how their browser
works. For some this may be trivial, but for many it is a
difficult proposition. Even assuming a user is able to install
an add-on, they are offered incomplete protection: popular
add-ons such as Ghostery and Ad-Block+ rely on blacklists
of known tracking elements and fail to prevent all tracking.
A Firefox add-on, RequestPolicy [22], does block all third-
party requests, but at the expense of breaking the rendering
mechanisms of many pages, leaving the average user with a
confused mess of text on her or his screen. While these add-
ons do indeed offer a significant degree of protection, they
7http://www.aboutads.info
8http://www.aboutads.info/choices/
also place the burden on users and highlight the blame-the-
victim mentality at the core of the issue. Furthermore, these
add-ons are not available on the stock browsers included on
Android phones and tablets, though recent additions to Ap-
ple iOS 9 have introduced content blocking. Given the short-
comings of the above two solutions, it would seem that the
simplest way to reduce unwanted tracking would not be set-
ting hundreds of cookies, or installing cumbersome browser
add-ons, but by having a clear way for users to signal to
corporations that they should not be tracked. But what is
the best way to send this signal? Once again, the lowly
HTTP request is the answer. It is now possible to configure
all major web browsers (Internet Explorer, Safari, Chrome,
Firefox, and Opera) to send a message within the body of a
request which indicates the user does not want to be tracked;
when the aforementioned“user-agent” is sent to a server, an-
other field, “DNT” may be sent as well. DNT may be set to
“1”, indicating a user does not want to be tracked, or “0”,
indicating they would like to be tracked; if there is no value
set, no conclusions about a user’s preference may be drawn
[18]. It would seem the problem is therefore solved: a user
may now easily tell trackers to leave them alone by changing
a single browser setting.
However, DNT comes with no enforcement mechanism - it
is merely a polite request, and trackers may ignore it as they
choose - and indeed they do. For example, comScore, the
fifth most prevalent tracker, states in their privacy policy
that “comScore.com does not react to [i.e. ignores] Do Not
Track signals”.9 Investigation of the policies of the top ten
corporations with tracking elements shows that nine of them
do not respect the DNT header. One company, Yahoo!, re-
spected DNT for a time, but on April 30th, 2014 reversed
course and stated that “As of today, web browser Do Not
Track settings will no longer be enabled on Yahoo”.10 The
only company in the top ten to respect the DNT header is
Twitter. According to Twitter, “When you turn on DNT
in your browser, we stop collecting the information that
allows us to tailor suggestions based on your recent visits
to websites that have integrated our buttons or widgets”11.
It is important to note that Twitter follows the reasonable
definition of opt-out, namely user data is not collected, as
opposed to the DAA’s solution of tailored advertising not
being shown. Twitter’s position is admirable and represents
the standard to which other companies should aspire.
Given that 90% of the top ten tracking companies ignore
DNT, it seems that the standard is a failure. However, this
does not need to be the case. As mentioned earlier, Hoofna-
gle et al. have determined that 60% of those surveyed sup-
ported the DNT standard. If these users were able to have
their wishes given the force of law - as should be possible in
democracies - the behavior of Twitter would not represent a
benevolent exception, but a legally enforced rule. The fact
of the matter is that the technical groundwork exists, public
desire exists, and all that is still needed is for law makers
to fulfill their duty to side with citizens against unwelcome
9http://www.comscore.com/About-comScore/Privacy-
Policy
10http://yahoopolicy.tumblr.com/post/84363620568/yahoos-
default-a-personalized-experience
11https://support.twitter.com/articles/20169453-twitter-
supports-do-not-track
corporate practices.
8. CONCLUSION
Three things have hopefully been established by this arti-
cle: first, Westin’s socially “intolerable” use of technology
has come to pass; second, Senator Church’s warning of an
“abyss” of technologically advanced state surveillance was
prophetic; and third, there is a way out. By using a quan-
titative approach towards the issue of web tracking, it has
been determined that user privacy is widely compromised
by numerous parties in tandem, users often have limited
means to detect these privacy breeches, a handful of pow-
erful corporations receive the vast majority of user data,
and that state intelligence agencies such as the NSA may
be leveraging this commercial surveillance infrastructure for
their own purposes. Furthermore, current privacy protec-
tions are wholly inadequate in light of the scale and scope
of the problem. Despite this, by having singled out the cor-
porations who covertly observe users, it is now possible to
identify the degree to which these companies abide by ex-
pressed user preference, or fail to do so. A full exploration of
specific policy implementations is beyond the purview of this
research, but the measures contained herein may be used by
the policy community to inform, support, and advance so-
lutions which ensure that DNT moves from a polite request
to an enforceable command.
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Table 1: Findings Summary
Rank TLD N % W/3PE Ave. Domains Contacted % W/Cookie % W/JS
- * 950,489 86.9 9.47 62.9 82.99
1 com 517,085 88.47 10.2 64.66 84.5
2 net 49,471 83.03 10.2 61.58 77.65
3 org 37,568 85.73 7.81 58.23 81.28
4 ru 37,560 94.33 8.48 89.42 88.72
5 de 32,447 85.34 7.52 52.87 79.26
6 uk 17,976 87.47 9.11 61.09 85.02
7 br 15,420 87.85 11 62.33 85.65
8 jp 14,478 82.05 6.87 48.08 79.52
9 pl 12,627 90.04 7.75 57.87 87.96
10 in 12,271 81.79 10.35 57.86 77.14
..
43 edu 2,416 89.74 5.67 47.64 88.49
..
65 gov 762 86.48 3.61 39.63 84.65
Table 2: Top Image Characteristics
Rank % Sites File Name Domain Company Visible Indicates Owner
1 46.02% utm.gif google-analytics.com Google N N
2 21.34% LVx-xkvaJ0b.png akamaihd.net Akamai/Facebook Y Y
3 6.97% nessie icon tiamat white.png googlesyndication.net Google Y N
4 5.16% utm.gif doubleclick.net Google N N
5 3.81% g.gif wordpress.com Wordpress N N
6 3.45% vendor.gif reson8.com Resonate N N
7 2.57% icon18 wrench allbkg.png blogblog.com Google Y N
8 1.78% demconf.jpg demdex.net Adobe N N
9 1.73% small-logo.png google.com Google Y Y
10 1.69% pixel.gif amazonaws.com Amazon N N
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Figure 1: Percentage of Sites Tracked by Top 50 Corporations
